Ethical Theories and Moral Guidance by Vayrynen, P
promoting access to White Rose research papers
White Rose Research Online
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
This is the published version of an article in Utilitas, 18 (3)
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/76784
Published article:
Vayrynen, P (2006) Ethical Theories and Moral Guidance. Utilitas, 18 (3). 291 -
309. ISSN 0953-8208
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820806002056
Ethical Theories and Moral
Guidance
P E K K A V A¨ Y R Y N E N
University of California, Davis
Let the Guidance Constraint be the following norm for evaluating ethical theories: Other
things being at least roughly equal, ethical theories are better to the extent that they
provide adequate moral guidance. I offer an account of why ethical theories are subject to
the Guidance Constraint, if indeed they are. We can explain central facts about adequate
moral guidance, and their relevance to ethical theory, by appealing to certain forms
of autonomy and fairness. This explanation is better than explanations that feature
versions of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In closing, I address the objection that
my account is questionable because it makes ethical theories subject not merely to purely
theoretical but also to morally substantive norms.
I. INTRODUCTION
What should we think of an ethical theory that places us in the
predicament reflected in Russell Banks’s short story ‘Sarah Cole: A
Type of Love Story’?
When you have never done a thing before and that thing is not clearly right or
wrong, you frequently do not know if it is a cruel thing, you just go ahead and
do it and maybe later you’ll be able to determine whether you acted cruelly.
That way you’ll know if it was right or wrong of you to have done it in the first
place; too late, of course, but at least you’ll know.1
An ethical theory that makes right actions frequently inaccessible to
us, or offers us mere hindsight in the face of moral novelty, uncertainty
and difficulty, fails adequately to guide action. Is such an ethical theory
worse than one that does provide adequate moral guidance?
We can distinguish two motivations for constructing ethical theories.2
One is practical: we might want an ethical theory to guide action.3
Another is theoretical and, specifically, explanatory: we might want
an ethical theory to explain why certain actions are right and others
wrong. To achieve the practical aim, a theory has to identify features
of right or obligatory actions which are readily accessible at least
to conscientious agents, so that they can determine what is right in
particular cases by determining which options have the features in
question. To achieve the explanatory aim, the theory has to identify
1 Russell Banks, Success Stories (New York, 1986), p. 149.
2 By ‘an ethical theory’ I mean a theory about the content of morality, such as a theory
of what is morally right.
3 To simplify discussion, I set aside other distinctive practical functions of normative
judgements, such as the critical stance they provide on our immediate desires and aims.
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features which make actions right or obligatory. These aims are distinct:
it is necessary neither that the features that make right actions right
are also readily accessible features that help us decide what is right
in particular cases, nor that the latter features also are features that
make right actions right. Thus it is not incoherent to ignore or discount
the practical aim in evaluating ethical theories. An explanatory ethical
theory may fail to give adequate guidance for acting rightly, and yet give
a correct account of what is right. Utilitarian principles, for example,
are often presented as standards of rightness but (for familiar reasons)
not decision-procedures.4
We might, however, think that even theories that do not aim to
provide adequate moral guidance are nonetheless better to the extent
that they also do provide adequate guidance, instead of thinking that
doing so is no merit at all. Ethical theories are, after all, practical in
their subject matter. To treat the claim that an ethical theory gives
insufficient guidance for doing what we ought as an objection to the
theory is to rely on the following norm for evaluating ethical theories:
Guidance Constraint: Other things being at least roughly equal,
ethical theories are better to the extent that they provide adequate
moral guidance.
My aim is to contribute to our understanding of why ethical theories
are subject to the Guidance Constraint, if indeed they are, rather than
to argue that they are. I shall largely ignore the sizeable literature on
whether there is a guidance constraint on ethical theories, for the ex-
planatory question that interests me here is usually neglected in that
literature. I find such neglect odd. Whether we are entitled to use the
Guidance Constraint in evaluating ethical theories depends on whether
it tracks any characteristics about which we should care in an ethical
theory.
I begin with some central facts about adequate moral guidance
and the relation between ethical theories and moral guidance (§II). I
proceed to argue that we can explain those facts on the basis of certain
forms of autonomy and fairness (§III). I then argue that this account
explains facts about moral guidance better than various versions of the
principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (§IV). My overall claim is conditional:
if ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint, then the
best explanation of this fact appeals to the forms of autonomy and
fairness in question. In closing, I respond to the objection that my
account of the Guidance Constraint is questionable because it makes
ethical theories subject not merely to purely theoretical norms but also
to morally substantive norms (§V).
4 See e.g. R. Eugene Bales, ‘Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right Making Charac-
teristics or Decision-Making Procedure?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971).
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II. WHAT IS ADEQUATE MORAL GUIDANCE?
An ethical theory gives adequate moral guidance if it makes reliable
strategies for acting well – for doing the right thing for the right reasons
in particular situations – available to practical thinking.5 Accounts of
why ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint should
explain three central facts about adequate guidance and their relevance
to ethical theory.6 (1) An ethical theory fails to provide adequate
moral guidance if it evaluates certain actions as right and others as
wrong without providing any sufficiently reliable direction for acting in
conformity with those evaluations.7 A theory that is unreliable will all
too easily lead us to act wrongly.8 (2) For an ethical theory to provide
adequate guidance, an agent’s acceptance of it should reliably lead her
to perform right actions on the basis of her acceptance of it, and for the
reasons why (according to the theory) right actions are right.9 Even if
doing the right thing for non-moral reasons (say, to avoid punishment)
5 I owe the expression ‘a reliable strategy for doing the right thing for the right reasons’
to Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, ‘The Many Moral Particularisms’, Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 35 (2005), p. 86. By ‘practical thinking’ I mean processes of
reasoning – and, more generally, rational transitions in thought which need not proceed
explicitly from premisses to conclusions – which conclude, if not in action, then at least
in a decision (i.e. in the formation of an intention) to act.
6 Moral theorists who deny that moral principles need be suitable for use in public
justification are not thereby enemies of the Guidance Constraint. Because we know more
than we can articulate, a reliable strategy for acting well may be available to us even
if we are unable to articulate the considerations governing our deliberations in a way
that public justification requires. If so, violating the publicity condition does not entail
violating the Guidance Constraint.
7 What it is for a strategy to be sufficiently reliable depends on two further questions.
What is a sufficient degree of reliability? And what is a sufficient scope of reliability
(that is, what is the range of possible worlds across which a strategy for acting well
must be reliable to whatever is the requisite degree)? These questions lie downstream
from my present purposes, but I suspect that the relevant standards of reliability will be
analogous to those in epistemology.
8 More precisely, an ethical theory that provides adequate moral guidance should
provide reliable strategies for doing what it evaluates as objectively right in the sense
of corresponding to what is in fact right in the agent’s situation. For ethical theories do
not merely tell us what is subjectively right in the sense corresponding to what an agent
is justified in believing to be right in her situation. (According to some ethical theories,
such as decision-theoretic consequentialism, what is objectively right in this sense is,
nonetheless, partly a function of the agent’s probability function. See e.g. Frank Jackson,
‘Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection’, Ethics
101 (1991).) To remain neutral on what is objectively right, I shall treat the Guidance
Constraint as requiring an ethical theory to provide reliable strategies for doing what
the theory says is objectively right. So understood, the constraint allows us to evaluate
an ethical theory independently of whether its account of right action is correct.
9 Or, at least, it should lead her to do so if ethical theory acceptance is sufficiently
motivating. I set aside questions about the fit between the motivational demands of
morality and the motivational powers of ethical theory acceptance. Thus I remain neutral
on the issue whether the acceptance of an ethical theory involves not only certain
belief-forming dispositions but also a range of deliberative, motivational and affective
dispositions. For discussion, see Pekka Va¨yrynen, ‘Usable Moral Principles’, Challenging
Moral Particularism, ed. M. Lance, M. Potrc, and V. Strahovnik (London, forthcoming).
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were a reliable way to act rightly, it would not be a case of moral
guidance.10 (3) A reliable strategy for acting well must be available,
in the sense I explain shortly, for use in agents’ practical thinking.
If an ethical theory only identifies features of right actions that are
either inaccessible even to a conscientious agent or accessible only in
hindsight, it provides no useful direction for acting well.
In what ways may an ethical theory provide adequate guidance?
We saw that no necessary connection exists between the accessible
features of right actions, by reference to which we can determine what
actions are right in particular circumstances, and the features that
make right actions right. So an ethical theory may satisfy the Guidance
Constraint even if its standards of right action do not directly provide
useful direction. For even if those standards are complex or difficult
to apply, the theory may satisfy the constraint indirectly, by providing
surrogate devices that we can follow in some way that is sensitive
to their reliability. While such devices may take the form of moral
principles, they may instead be guidelines for kinds of thinking, such
as analogical reasoning, which need not rely on principles.11 Strategies
for acting well need not consist in moral principles.12
Whatever strategies for acting well are like, they need to cover only
the circumstances the agent is likely to encounter in order for them to
provide reliable guidance. A reliable guide need not cover all cases. It
may have some false implications. It may even be purely heuristic. Yet
a simplified guide may provide us with more reliable direction than an
accurate but complex standard of right action. To illustrate, beings with
limited cognitive capacities are prone to mistakes in utility calculations.
Utilitarians from Mill on typically respond that, in so far as following
commonsense moral precepts approximates following the principle of
utility, the former provides us with a reliable and available strategy for
maximizing utility. Thus, even if following utilitarian principles is not
itself a reliable and available strategy for acting well, utilitarianism
10 The Guidance Constraint is neutral with respect to which reasons are the right
ones. Two ethical theories might be coextensive, and yet disagree about which features
of right actions are those that make them right. To evaluate an ethical theory specifically
with respect to the Guidance Constraint is to determine whether it provides adequate
guidance for performing those actions that it evaluates as right, and performing them for
the reasons it identifies as the right ones.
11 For discussion, see e.g. Gerald Dworkin, ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 20 (1995).
12 Thus, moral particularists need not reject the Guidance Constraint. They typically
claim that moral principles provide poor moral guidance, but this does not mean that
they reject the Guidance Constraint. Similarly, the potential objection that particularist
ethical theories fail to provide adequate guidance is plainly distinct from the claim that
particularists reject the constraint. See e.g. David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford,
1988), pp. 190–3; Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford, 1993), p. 64.
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may satisfy the Guidance Constraint via familiar indirection moves.
The point generalizes to a host of other ethical theories.13
To return to the availability component of adequate moral guidance,
let us note that whether a strategy for acting well is available for use
in an agent’s practical thinking depends on her cognitive capacities.14
Because agents differ in their cognitive capacities, a guide that provides
useful direction for one type of moral agent might be useless (for
example, too difficult to apply) for another, or useless in one kind
of context but not in another for one and the same agent. So the
availability clause states a demand for guides for particular kinds of
agents in particular kinds of contexts.15
What does this demand amount to? Following a strategy for acting
well requires agents to acquire information about their circumstances,
and perform inferences and calculations using that information, in
their decision-making. For a given strategy to be available to a given
kind of agent, the conditions for its use cannot depend on information
or inferences and calculations that are relevant to deciding what is
right in a particular situation but inaccessible or unmanageable to
the agent. Thus the Guidance Constraint implies something like the
following availability condition:
Cognitive Condition: For any strategy S for acting well and any type
of moral agent A, S is available to A for use in her practical thinking
only to the extent that satisfying the conditions for using S in one’s
practical thinking lies within the limits of A’s cognitive capacities.
13 For example, R. M. Hare’s distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘critical’ moral thinking,
though developed in the context of utilitarianism, makes a general two-tiered structure
available to many other kinds of ethical theories whose standards of right action are
difficult to apply directly. Examples would be theories that deploy ideal observer or ideal
advisor devices, or the notion of the virtuous person. See R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking
(Oxford, 1981).
14 It does not follow from this that the content of standards of right action is itself
constrained by the cognitive capacities of the agents bound by those standards. As we
shall see in §§III–IV, my account of the Guidance Constraint avoids this controversial
implication and this gives it an advantage over a competing account.
15 See McKeever and Ridge, ‘The Many Moral Particularisms’, p. 86. This point,
together with our earlier point that an ethical theory may satisfy the Guidance Constraint
indirectly, allows ethical theories to provide different strategies for differentially
competent moral agents. This possibility undermines the following objection (due to
an anonymous referee) to the Guidance Constraint: if the same theory must be capable
of guiding agents both on the upper and the lower ends of the spectrum of cognitive and
moral competence, then those on the upper end might have to use a rougher-grained
theory than they are capable of using. But in that case they might have to do worse
with respect to acting well than their cognitive capacities allow. This objection fails. For
example, if we follow some set of surrogate devices in some way that is sensitive to
whether doing so is a good way of putting (say) the principle of utility into practice, we
are plausibly said to guide ourselves by the same theory as the more competent agents
who are capable of using the utilitarian calculus directly. Yet the latter agents can do as
well as they are capable of with respect to acting well.
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To get a grip on the Cognitive Condition, note that variations in cogni-
tive performance between people and between different times in a per-
son’s life have two importantly different sources. One is that cognitive
performance is vulnerable to various distorting, but usually transient,
conditions. Examples include the influence of bias, prejudice and
morally irrelevant desire, as well as fatigue, listlessness, impatience,
anxiety and laziness. The other is that people differ in their cognitive
capacities. In assessing whether a strategy for acting well is available
to a particular kind of agent, the Cognitive Condition permits us
to idealize only the conditions under which those agents exercise
their cognitive capacities. Idealizing those very capacities might make
satisfying the conditions for the use of the strategy unavailable to the
actual agents, given their limited capacities.16
As stated, the Cognitive Condition does not say to what kinds of
agents an ethical theory that gives adequate moral guidance should
make strategies for acting well available. The condition might seem
toothless if it did not constrain the range of these agents. For example,
the fundamental principle of direct objective act-utilitarianism is
directly available to the practical thinking of the exceedingly rare kind
of agents who possess the empirical information and the reasoning
capacities required for correctly calculating which of the available
alternatives the principle requires them to choose.17 If the Guidance
Constraint is to have teeth, we should relativize the Cognitive
Condition not (merely) to an ethical theory but (also) to some limits
in the people’s cognitive capacities.
The relevant cognitive capacities are those of normal moral agents.
Among actual beings, normal human adults tend to be those who are
morally competent to at least a minimally sufficient degree.18 Thus,
no ethical theory provides adequate guidance in actual life unless it
makes reliable strategies for acting well available to normal moral
agents. But one intuition behind the Guidance Constraint is this: an
ethical theory is in one respect worse if it tells us to act in certain ways
but provides no strategy that we can use for acting in those ways. Since
the relativization I propose captures this intuition, I shall now take it
as understood when I speak of the Cognitive Condition.
16 As Richard Foley says in a different context, ‘we can legitimately idealize away
various distorting conditions, ones that interfere with the operation of these abilities and
skills . . . . But we are to avoid idealizations of the abilities and skills themselves.’ See
Richard Foley, Working Without a Net (New York, 1993), p. 160.
17 See Erik Carlson, ‘Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action’,
Erkenntnis 57 (2002), p. 74.
18 Limits of space force me to leave the complicated notion of normality intuitive. I
discuss normality, though in a different context, in Pekka Va¨yrynen, ‘Particularism and
Default Reasons’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2004), pp. 58–66.
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III. AUTONOMY, FAIRNESS AND MORAL GUIDANCE
Now that we have a decent idea of what adequate moral guidance
is, I shall argue that if ethical theories are subject to the Guidance
Constraint, the best explanation of this fact features certain forms of
autonomy and fairness.
Consider an agent who accepts a given ethical theory and
understands at least those aspects of it that are crucial for determining
which particular actions are (according to the theory) right and
wrong. Such an agent has certain moral ideals: ends, values, concerns,
commitments and ideals that she, in virtue of accepting the theory,
prefers to guide her decisions and conduct. If the theory fails to make
a reliable strategy for acting well available to the agent, she cannot,
even in her conscientious moments, adequately guide herself by her
moral ideals; her actions will only haphazardly serve those ideals. But
if a conscientious morally committed agent cannot guide herself by
her moral ideals, she must guide herself by such generally unreliable
strategies for acting well as whims, coin tosses, self-interest, etiquette,
tradition, religious authority or ‘The Ethicist’ column. An agent who is
guided by such strategies will fail to be self-governing with respect to
her own moral ideals.
Self-governance is something we often have in mind when we talk
about autonomy.19 Thus, in a clear sense, the inability to guide one’s
actions on the basis of one’s moral ideals undermines the ability of the
agents whom it strikes to act autonomously in the light of their moral
ideals.20 Of course, not all values are moral values. An agent can act
autonomously in the light of her non-moral values even if the ethical
theory she accepts fails to make a reliable strategy for acting well
available to her. Even so, an ethical theory provides adequate moral
19 While I focus on autonomy understood as self-governance, people have, of course,
characterized autonomy in a wide variety of ways. Gerald Dworkin concludes a survey
of characterizations with mild sarcasm: ‘About the only features held constant from one
author to another are that autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a desirable
quality to have.’ See Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge, 1988),
p. 6. Nomy Arpaly lists eight different things that have all been called ‘autonomy’. See
Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (Oxford, 2003), pp. 118–25. I was first alerted to the bearing
of self-governance on the guidance of action by Holly M. Smith, ‘Making Moral Decisions’,
Nouˆs 22 (1988), p. 105, and Alan H. Goldman, ‘Rules and Moral Reasoning’, Synthese
117 (1999), p. 236.
20 Sometimes by ‘autonomy’ we mean responsiveness to reasons. See e.g. George Sher,
‘Liberal Neutrality and the Value of Autonomy’, Contemporary Political and Social
Philosophy, ed. E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (Cambridge, 1995). While we
should not identify self-governance with responsiveness to reasons, an account of the
Guidance Constraint that appeals to self-governance is entitled to subsume both under
the general rubric of autonomy. An agent who accepts an ethical theory is self-governing,
so far as her moral ideals go, in so far as her practical thinking responds, in virtue of her
acceptance of the theory, to (what, according to the theory, are) the right reasons.
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guidance only if agents who accept the theory can act autonomously on
the basis of, specifically, their moral values.21
The role of self-governance in agency helps to explain why an ethical
theory is better to the extent that it makes reliable strategies for acting
well available to an agent who accepts it. Self-governance matters to
us because (a) it plays an important role in our ability reliably to serve
our ends and (b) without that capacity (or its effective operation) we
would not be agents at all. Regarding (b), self-governance is at least a
feature of the effective exercise of the capacities constitutive of agency,
if not partly constitutive of agency itself. Regarding (a), an agent is
in a position autonomously to serve certain of her ends, namely her
moral ideals, only in so far as the ethical theory she accepts provides a
strategy for acting well that identifies certain features of right actions:
accessible features (say, helping someone in need or avoiding causing
pain) such that forming intentions on their basis is a reliable way for an
agent to form intentions to perform right actions. An ethical theory that
fails to accommodate (a) and (b) fails to protect autonomy understood
as self-governance.
A full explanation of facts about adequate moral guidance requires
more than the autonomy condition, however. Considerations of
autonomy alone are silent on the range of agents to whom an ethical
theory should provide adequate moral guidance. But if the Guidance
Constraint implies the Cognitive Condition, it requires ethical theories
to provide adequate guidance to normal moral agents. We can explain
why the Guidance Constraint requires an ethical theory to enable any
normal agent who accepts the theory to govern herself on the basis
of her moral ideals if we think, further, that the Guidance Constraint
rests in part on what I shall (for lack of a better term) call fairness in
the provision of the opportunity for morally committed moral agents to
act well autonomously.
21 These claims are independent of any particular conception of autonomy. But
assessing whether an ethical theory provides adequate guidance may have to rely on
auxiliary assumptions about autonomy. Suppose, for example, that we reject ‘content-
neutral’ or purely ‘structural’ conceptions of autonomy, according to which autonomy is
compatible with adopting any ideals or values. See e.g. Harry Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of
the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971); and Dworkin,
Autonomy. Then our conception of autonomy carries commitments that may restrict the
range of ethical theories that we can autonomously accept. For then being autonomous
is not compatible with the adoption of just any ideals or values, but either (i) requires
the adoption of certain ideals or values, such as perhaps one’s own dignity as a person,
or (ii) rules out the adoption of certain ideals or values, such as perhaps servility or self-
effacement (see e.g. Sigurdur Kristinsson, ‘The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly
Substantive Account of Autonomy’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000)), or at least
(iii) carries some normative presuppositions (see e.g. Henry Richardson, ‘Autonomy’s
Many Normative Presuppositions’, American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001)).
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This form of fairness is important if an ethical theory should make
a successful moral life available to more or less any subject of its
moral requirements. Such fairness seems fundamental to morality.
Any ethical theory implies that agents who without a good excuse act
wrongly are morally blameworthy. A theory that makes no reliable
strategy for acting well available even to conscientious normal agents
may excuse their failure to act well. But excuses are typically applicable
only in the context of wrongdoing. If a life which is rife with wrongdoing
but to which little blameworthiness accrues counted as a successful
moral life, such a life would be the stuff of minimal achievement. More
plausibly, the measure of a successful moral life is the extent to which it
consists in morally right actions. Then the idea that an ethical theory
should make a successful moral life available to the subjects of its
moral requirements requires that, for more or less any normal moral
agent, the theory makes some or other reliable strategy for acting well
available to her. A theory that meets the fairness condition satisfies
this requirement. Thus, fairness in the provision of opportunities for
leading a successful moral life helps to explain why an ethical theory
should make strategies for acting well available to more or less any
normal moral agent.22
The fairness condition explains also why the Cognitive Condition
is the relevant availability condition in the Guidance Constraint. If
an ethical theory should provide adequate moral guidance in order
that more or less any normal agent can govern herself by the moral
ideals she would have if she accepted the theory, it should provide
strategies for acting well that accommodate the cognitive limits of
normal agents. To require normal agents to act in certain ways, when
the use of the strategies for acting in those ways depend on factors
that are cognitively inaccessible to normal agents, is unfair. It is unfair
because it makes a successful moral life (one consisting in morally
right actions) unavailable even to conscientious normal agents, except
by luck or happenstance.23
At the same time, the fairness condition explains why the Cognitive
Condition allows ethical theories to reflect realistic differences in
people’s cognitive capacities. For it helps to make sense of what
conditions for the use of strategies for acting well are reasonable.
Consider, for analogy, that we can reasonably demand certain things
of anyone holding a driver’s license.24 Those who get a driver’s license
22 For a theory to meet the fairness condition is alone sufficient for it to meet the
Guidance Constraint if a successful moral life consists in autonomously performed right
actions. But I need not take a stand on this latter claim.
23 It also compromises the ability of agents who accept the theory to act autonomously
in the light of their moral ideals or values.
24 I am grateful to Terence Irwin for suggesting this analogy to me.
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differ in reaction time, night vision, and the like, but we can reasonably
require anyone to meet some threshold in order to qualify. If some can
meet it only by taking defensive driving courses or installing some
technical device in their vehicle, they are reasonably required to do so.
In the moral case, we can reasonably require agents to inquire into
the nature of the situation when deciding what to do. The existence of
epistemic couch potatoes who care not a whit about the relevant facts
or about proportioning their beliefs to their evidence does not dictate
what sort of inquiry the use of a strategy for acting well can reasonably
demand of agents. Moreover, while people’s cognitive performance may
fall short of their competence under distorting conditions, we can
reasonably require them to do their best to control for such distortions,
so as to achieve favourable conditions for judgement. Since my fairness
condition proportions the requirement to do one’s best to normal agents’
competence, it allows that meeting the requirement may be easier
for some agents than others.25 What a strategy for acting well can
reasonably require of agents depends on what normal agents can
achieve with due care and diligence in exercising their limited cognitive
capacities.
Given this background, the autonomy condition explains why an
ethical theory does not violate the Guidance Constraint when normal
agents’ failure to use a strategy for acting well is due to internal
cognitive or temperamental interferences with the operation of their
cognitive capacities. A normal agent who conscientiously follows a
strategy for acting well may fail to choose or act autonomously in
the light of her moral ideals if she lacks the mental power to choose
the action she judges best or lacks the power to perform bodily
movements that, if she were successful, would constitute doing what
she has decided to do. Since such failures in the ‘internal’ conditions of
autonomy mark no shortcoming in a strategy for acting well, but only
in the agent, they do not show that the strategy undermines normal
25 Here we can see why fairness provides a better basis than equality for the
requirement that ethical theories should make a reliable strategy for acting well available
to more or less any normal moral agent. Intuitively, the Guidance Constraint permits
an ethical theory to provide better moral guidance to some agents than others, so long
as it provides adequate moral guidance to more or less everyone. Consider the analogy
(suggested to me by Terence Irwin) that we can fairly expect everyone in a class to pass
a swimming test, even if it is easier for some people than others, and even if some will do
better at it than others, provided that it is open to everyone to do well enough. Similarly,
an ethical theory may provide better or easier moral guidance to some persons than
others without being unfair, so long as it provides good enough guidance to everyone. The
Guidance Constraint allows this, since an ethical theory may satisfy the constraint by
providing differentially competent moral agents with different strategies for acting well
(see n. 15). Even if a given strategy for acting well happens to be more reliable or more
available to some agents than others, it may still provide, for more or less any normal
agent, some sufficiently reliable strategy for acting well that is available to her.
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agents’ capacity to act on the basis of their moral ideals.26 Thus, my
double appeal to autonomy and fairness explains why it is that an
ethical theory violates the Cognitive Condition only in so far as the
reason why normal agents fail to be self-governing is that the conditions
for the use of the theory’s strategies for acting well lie beyond the limits
of such agents’ cognitive capacities. Notice that we obtain this result
without having to adjust the standards of right action themselves to
the cognitive capacities of any agents, normal or otherwise.
IV. THE OUGHT–CAN PRINCIPLE AND MORAL GUIDANCE
So far, I have shown that we can explain central facts about adequate
moral guidance, and describe their relevance to ethical theory, in terms
of certain forms of autonomy and fairness. I shall now argue that this
explanation is better than the natural and tempting alternative that
ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint because ‘ought’
implies ‘can’. We can state this principle like this:
(OC) Necessarily, for any agent A, any action ϕ and any time t: A ought
(morally) to ϕ at t only if A can ϕ at t.
My understanding of (OC) is not exotic. I take it that ‘ought’ expresses
objective moral obligation or requirement, ‘can’ expresses ability plus
opportunity of some sort, and the two are related synchronically: an
obligation at a given time is related with ability plus opportunity
at that time.27 I also grant that there is some reading of ‘can’ such
that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ by conceptual necessity. The attraction of
accounting for facts about adequate moral guidance in terms of (OC), so
read, is twofold. Unless ‘ought’ were essentially used to guide agents,
it might be difficult to see why ‘ought’ should apply, as (OC) says it
does, only to actions that agents can perform. And if (OC) holds by
conceptual necessity, then (OC) lacks the sorts of substantive normative
commitments that my own account seems to carry. But, as I shall argue,
no version of (OC) both holds by conceptual necessity and explains facts
about adequate moral guidance at least as well as my own proposal.
26 Freedom from such interferences as coercion, indoctrination and manipulation are
‘external’ conditions of autonomy. Assessing an ethical theory in terms of the Guidance
Constraint may abstract from external interferences. For more on internal and external
conditions of autonomy, see e.g. David Copp, ‘The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason’,
Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2005), p. 170.
27 For discussion and massive references to literature, see e.g. Peter B. Vranas, ‘I Ought,
Therefore I Can’, Philosophical Studies (forthcoming). For a formulation of (OC) according
to which ‘ought’ implies ‘can or could have’, see Ishtiyaque Haji, Deontic Morality and
Control (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 14, 50–1.
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According to (OC), what one ought to do depends, by conceptual
necessity, on what one can do. But what is the relevant sense of ‘can’?
That an agent can ϕ implies at least that ϕ-ing is physically open to
her: she must have the requisite physical capacities to ϕ and be in a
position to exercise those capacities. If I have no opportunity to save my
fellow martyr from being ravaged by the lions because I am bound to a
post, I cannot have a moral obligation to save her. When (OC) is read
as the claim that a moral obligation to ϕ conceptually entails a physical
ability plus opportunity to ϕ, (OC) explains the obvious fact that, in
order for an ethical theory to guide an agent in a given situation, it
must prescribe only actions that are physically available to the agent
in that situation.28
If physical ability plus opportunity is all we read into ‘can’, (OC)
cannot explain why ethical theories should make reliable strategies for
acting well available to normal agents. On this ‘fully factual’ reading,
nothing in (OC) guarantees that I will not be informationally impaired
with respect to what I ought to do in particular circumstances. For
a simple example, consider Safe: the only way to disarm a bomb
whose detonation would kill millions of people is by opening the safe
and pressing the green button inside.29 Cases like Safe show that
the fully factual reading of (OC) fails fully to explain facts about
adequate moral guidance. So read, (OC) entails that I ought to open
the safe. For although I do not know what I need to do in order to
open the safe, I have the physical ability and opportunity to dial any
combination, and hence the right combination. Indeed, I ought to open
the safe even if these facts are unknowable to me. But a theory that
assigns (whether correctly or not) such an obligation to me violates
the Guidance Constraint. It can make no strategy for doing what I
ought available to me. Thus, if we read (OC) so as to allow that right
actions may have no features whose presence is reliably accessible
to conscientious normal agents, then (OC) cannot explain why the
Guidance Constraint should require ethical theories to make reliable
strategies for acting well available for use in normal agents’ practical
thinking.
(OC) can explain why adequate moral guidance cannot depend on
factors that a given kind of agent cannot access only if the claim that
such an agent can ϕ implies also that ϕ-ing is epistemically open to her –
that certain kinds of information pertaining to the act are available to
her. On objective act-utilitarianism, for example, the relevant kind of
28 Notice that my account explains this fact equally well. If an agent could only serve
her ends by performing physically unavailable actions, this would undermine her capacity
to act autonomously in the light of her moral ideals.
29 I borrow Safe from Haji, Deontic Morality, p. 16.
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information would serve reliably to identify the actions that maximize
utility. Thus (OC) can even hope to explain facts about adequate
guidance only if we read it as linking ‘ought’ also to knowledge about
how the agent should act in order to do what she ought.30 This suggests
two relevant epistemic readings of ‘can’:
Actualist reading: A can ϕ at t only if A knows how to ϕ at t.
Modal reading: A can ϕ at t only if A can know how to ϕ at t.
The corresponding actualist reading of (OC) makes what an agent
ought to do depend on what is known to her, whereas the corresponding
modal reading of (OC) makes it depend on what is knowable to her. I
shall argue that on neither reading does (OC) both explain facts about
adequate moral guidance and hold by conceptual necessity.
The plausibility of the actualist epistemic reading of (OC) turns out
to rely on the modal reading. Sometimes an agent does not, at a given
time, know how to ϕ but nonetheless ought to ϕ, provided she can
know how to ϕ. For sometimes an agent who does not know how to ϕ
ought to know better; her ignorance is culpable. People who have little
experience with pets ought nonetheless to know that one does not dry
a puppy after a bath by throwing him in the microwave. By (OC), one
ought to know how to ϕ only if one can know how to ϕ. Since this is
what the modal epistemic reading of (OC) entails, the actualist reading
implicitly relies on the modal reading for its plausibility.
The modal epistemic reading of (OC) entails that the limits of our
cognitive capacities constrain the very standards of right action.31
That is why it promises to explain why providing adequate moral
guidance for an agent requires making a reliable strategy for acting
well available to her. If an agent ought to do something only if she can
(with sufficient reliability) know how to do it, then a reliable strategy
for acting well would seem to be available to her.
When we assess the capacity of the modal reading to explain facts
about adequate guidance, we run into the complication that claims
about what an agent can know are open to many readings. According
to the modal reading, is what an agent ought to do constrained by
what she can in principle know? What she can know if her cognitive
30 I take no stand on whether knowing how to ϕ entails or is a species of knowing that
one can ϕ.
31 James Griffin argues from (OC) to the strong claim that what actions are right is
subject to knowledge constraints. See Griffin, Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical
Beliefs (Oxford, 1996), pp. 96, 106. According to Griffin, the point generalizes: ‘There are
no moral norms outside the boundary set by our capacities’ (p. 100). For criticisms of such
a use of (OC), see e.g. Robert Stern, ‘Does “Ought” Imply “Can”? And Did Kant Think It
Does?’, Utilitas 16 (2004).
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capacities are as developed as is possible for humans? What she can
know qua a conscientious normal agent? What she can know qua the
individual agent she is? What she can reasonably be expected to know
given her background information and circumstances? (And so on.) At
least some of these readings are clearly not equivalent. Thus we must
choose among them if we are to rely on a univocal reading of (OC).
The problem with using any particular modal epistemic reading of
(OC) to explain facts about adequate moral guidance is that different
readings of what one can know have different morally substantive
implications for what one ought to do.32 Selecting any one of them as
specifying the epistemic condition on what one ought to do saddles the
corresponding reading of (OC) with morally substantive implications
concerning what obligations one has.33 We cannot simply stipulate
that the relevant epistemic condition concerns what conscientious
normal agents can know. For, as an intuitive element of the Guidance
Constraint, it is part of our present explanandum (recall §II). Moreover,
such a stipulation would make (OC) entail that the features that make
right actions right must be features to which we have reliable epistemic
access. But we cannot simply stipulate that the practical aim and the
explanatory aim for constructing ethical theories are not distinct after
all.
If the choice of the relevant reading of ‘can’ carries morally sub-
stantive implications, it is implausible that the relation which (OC)
asserts between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ holds by conceptual necessity. If
some modal epistemic reading of (OC) both held by conceptual neces-
sity and carried substantive moral commitments, it would rule out
on conceptual grounds any ethical theory according to which truths
about how we ought to act are conceptually independent of what we
can know.34 But if such theories are false, they seem to be substan-
tively rather than conceptually false. Moreover, although conceptual
connections can be opaque and surprising, a modal epistemic reading of
(OC) will assign to ‘ought’ entailments regarding what is knowable that
32 See Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford, 1995), pp. 53–4.
33 Alternatively, we might say that different epistemic readings of (OC) lead to a variety
of ‘oughts’ (what one ought to do by the lights of what one can know qua the individual
agent one is, and so on and so forth), but selecting any one of them as the reading that is
the most relevant to what one ought to do is a morally substantive choice. See Jackson,
‘Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism’, pp. 471–2.
34 Moral realists agree amongst themselves that realism is not the view that all ethical
truths are unknowable. The forms of moral realism alluded to in the text allow that some
ethical truths may be unknowable. Other forms of moral realism may hold that it is
not conceptually possible for ethical truth to transcend our capacity to discover it. One
such realist may be Thomas Nagel, but I find his remarks on the issue too ambiguous to
be confident one way or another. See Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York, 1986),
p. 139. Thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me of Nagel’s discussion.
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seem too fine-grained to be conceptual. For example, if we took (OC) to
entail that, by conceptual necessity, one ought to ϕ only if conscientious
normal agents can know how to ϕ, then it would be incoherent to claim
that one ought to ϕ only if agents whose cognitive capacities are as
developed as is possible for humans can know how to ϕ. The latter
claim may be incorrect, but it surely seems coherent. Finally, consider
someone who holds that having an obligation to ϕ is consistent with not
being able to know how to ϕ, on the grounds that the inability excuses
the agent’s failure to ϕ and thereby makes blame inappropriate.35 If
some modal epistemic reading of (OC) were a conceptual truth, this
claim would be incoherent. Whether or not the claim is correct, it surely
seems coherent.
I conclude that no reading of (OC) that can explain facts about
adequate moral guidance holds by conceptual necessity, and vice
versa.36 To escape my argument, one might seek a reading of (OC) that
explains facts about adequate moral guidance and cast it as a moral
principle that does not hold by conceptual necessity.37 I cannot rule
out this response right off the bat, since my own account requires some
morally substantive assumptions. My account is preferable, however. If
35 Note that the claim that epistemic inability is an excusing condition because it would
be wrong to blame a person for not doing something she cannot know how to do fails to
support the modal epistemic reading of (OC). Since claims of blameworthiness concern
agent-evaluation but (OC) concerns act-evaluation, it is possible that an agent ought to
ϕ even if she would not be blameworthy for not ϕ-ing. For discussion, see Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, ‘ “Ought” Conversationally Implies “Can” ’, Philosophical Review 93 (1988),
p. 250; and Stern, ‘Does “Ought” Imply Can”?’, p. 47.
36 Other options are to formulate (OC) in terms of metaphysical entailment (see
e.g. Haji, Deontic Morality, pp. 13–4) or conversational implicature (see e.g. Sinnott-
Armstrong, ‘Conversationally’), or as the defeasible meta-theoretical norm that, other
things being at least roughly equal, an ethical theory is better in so far as an agent
can (in the specified sense) do what the theory says she ought to do (see James Brown,
‘Moral Theory and the Ought-Can Principle’, Mind 86 (1977), pp. 220–2). It is hard to see
how any of these formulations would explain facts about adequate moral guidance much
better than formulations in terms of conceptual entailment.
37 A different possible response is to maintain that (OC) holds by conceptual necessity,
but hold that ‘ought’ conceptually underdetermines what must be knowable to the
agent in order for it to be true that she can do something. On this view, the morally
substantive implications of selecting a given interpretation of knowability as that which
partly determines the limits of ‘ought’ are due not to (OC) but to the comprehensive
theory of moral obligation that generates the choice. (This move follows an established
methodology: many philosophers reject epistemic readings of (OC) in favor of theories
of moral obligation that vindicate only the fully factual interpretation of (OC). See e.g.
Haji, Deontic Morality, pp. 16–21.) On this view, the content of ‘ought’ need not make fine-
grained distinctions regarding what is knowable. The explanation of facts about adequate
moral guidance based on (OC) is more secure to the extent that this is the case, in view
of the aforementioned substantive implications of such distinctions for what one ought
to do. But to account for those facts by appeal to such a reading of (OC) would allow an
ethical theory whose assignment of obligations satisfies (OC) to entail conditions for the
use of its strategies for acting well that violate the Cognitive Condition. So this response
will not help (OC) adequately to explain facts about adequate moral guidance.
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we explain facts about adequate moral guidance without appealing to
epistemic readings of (OC), we can separate the controversial issue
of whether our cognitive capacities constrain what we ought to do
from the uncontroversial point that they constrain what counts as
adequate guidance. Moreover, the appeal to an epistemic reading of
(OC), understood as a moral principle, is either arbitrary or not basic.
Each interpretation of what it is for something to be knowable to
an agent yields a distinct moral principle. (OC) can account for the
Cognitive Condition only if we select among those principles one on
which ‘can ϕ’ entails that conscientious normal agents can know how
to ϕ. But, again, we cannot simply stipulate that this is the relevant
principle. If there is no independent reason to select that particular
principle, using it to explain why ethical theories are subject to the
Guidance Constraint is arbitrary. But if there are independent reasons
to select that particular principle, we can bypass (OC) and account for
facts about adequate moral guidance directly in terms of those reasons.
Until we see such independent reasons, and unless they are distinct
from and more compelling than the forms of autonomy and fairness
to which my account appeals, these forms of autonomy and fairness
remain the best explanation of facts about adequate moral guidance
and their relevance to ethical theory.
V. THE GUIDANCE CONSTRAINT AND MORAL
METHODOLOGY
I shall close with the objection that if the best explanation of why ethical
theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint carries morally sub-
stantive commitments, the constraint cannot constitute an adequacy
condition on ethical theories. The objection stems from the idea that
adequacy conditions should hold ethical theories answerable not to
moral norms but only to purely theoretical, morally neutral norms. I
cannot here address, let alone settle, the general issue of what kinds of
norms are in play in the evaluation and selection of ethical theories. My
aim is merely to allay worries about holding ethical theories answerable
to moral norms in the way that my present proposal does.
Internal consistency, simplicity, unity and explanatory power are
plausible candidates for purely theoretical norms for evaluating ethical
theories: in so far as these features are advantages in a theory, they are
so regardless of the theory’s subject matter. My argument in the two
preceding sections suggests that we cannot account for the Guidance
Constraint in terms of purely theoretical norms.38 The capacity of
38 The fact that purely theoretical norms, such as simplicity, may conflict with the
Guidance Constraint poses no problem, since the former norms may conflict with one
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purely theoretical norms to discriminate among competing ethical
theories is limited anyway. For example, many philosophers argue
that an adequate ethical theory may not allow for situations in which
an agent ought (‘all things considered’) both to do A and to do B
(formally, O(A & B)), but in which she can only do either A or B but
not both. The thought is that genuine moral dilemmas of this kind are
impossible because the assumptions that generate their impossibility
are impeccable. But a deontic logic that is consistent with the possibility
of genuine moral dilemmas can itself be perfectly consistent, and need
be no less simple or unified than one that entails the impossibility of
moral dilemmas.39 Reasons to deny or allow the possibility of moral
dilemmas apparently have to stem from morally substantive rather
than purely theoretical norms.
Given the limited capacity of purely theoretical norms to discriminate
among competing ethical theories, it should be no surprise that many
norms that we deploy widely in evaluating ethical theories are not
morally neutral. Examples would be the familiar norms that, other
things being at least roughly equal, an ethical theory is better to
the extent that it accords with the firm, independently credible moral
intuitions that we have (or would retain) after careful reflection and to
the extent that it starts from attractive general beliefs about morality
(some of which presumably endorse the Guidance Constraint).40 These
norms are not morally neutral because they reflect substantive moral
ideals that enjoy at least provisional acceptance. Purifying our norms
for evaluating ethical theories of morally substantive implications
would require us to abandon norms that we deploy widely. If we are
unwilling to abandon those norms, we must also be open to the idea that
if ethical theories are better to the extent that they provide adequate
moral guidance, then the best explanation of that fact features some
morally substantive ideals.
One might still worry that holding ethical theories answerable to
morally substantive norms is unreasonable because it begs the question
against certain ethical theories. John Rawls suggests that the worry
another in the same way. If any complications arise here, they will concern the relative
weights of different norms for evaluating ethical theories. See n. 43 below.
39 A pair of such deontic logics, and a similar moral, can be found in John F. Horty,
‘Reasoning with Moral Conflicts’, Nouˆs 37 (2003). Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues more
generally that ‘we can build a deontic logic only by accepting axioms and rules of inference
that are incompatible with reasonable moral positions’. See Sayre-McCord, ‘Deontic
Logic and the Priority of Moral Theory’, Nouˆs 20 (1986), p. 179. In debates about moral
dilemmas, the most commonly disputed claims are the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’
and the ‘agglomeration principle’ (OA & OB)→ O(A & B).
40 See e.g. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp. 48–52; and
Brad Hooker, ‘Intuitions and Moral Theorizing’, Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations,
ed. P. Stratton-Lake (Oxford, 2002), pp. 168–70.
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is less serious than it may seem. The merit of proposed adequacy
conditions ‘depends upon the soundness of the theory that results’ and
such conditions can be justified ‘only by the reasonableness of the theory
of which they are a part’.41 Rawls’s idea may to some extent frustrate
our desire to establish adequacy conditions on ethical theories before
particular theories come in, so that we can prevent some from entering.
But its application to the Guidance Constraint is instructive.
Philosophers who deny that an ethical theory is any worse for failing
to provide adequate moral guidance must also deny that an ethical
theory is any worse for implying that what one ought to do is reliably
inaccessible to conscientious normal agents. The resulting theory may
be tenable, but given how widely it is seen as important for ethical
theories to avoid thwarting these practical and epistemic aims, to claim
that thwarting those aims is no cost at all in an ethical theory is to
give oneself a bullet-infested diet. Such a theory would depart from an
overlapping consensus on what aims it is important for ethical theories
to serve and what adequacy conditions reasonable ethical theories
impose upon themselves. If the practical aim of ethical theory turns
out to be important for morally substantive reasons, it does not follow
that the Guidance Constraint becomes unreasonable.
These comments reflect the methodological point that the assessment
of ethical theories is a holistic affair. The judgement that it is costly for
a theory to lack some feature typically relies on a large background of
auxiliary assumptions that themselves are open to scrutiny. Whether
we can reasonably hold ethical theories answerable to a given norm
depends on what else we regard as reasonable. Thus I see no good
reason for deciding in advance that only morally neutral assumptions
can reasonably influence our view of norms for evaluating ethical
theories. If my argument in this article is on the right track, exploring
our grounds for holding ethical theories answerable to the Guidance
Constraint reveals to us certain evaluative commitments, which we
can and should subject to further scrutiny.
Let me conclude with a dialectical point. I have argued that the
best explanation of why ethical theories are subject to the Guidance
Constraint, if indeed they are, features certain forms of autonomy
and fairness. If upon reflection we endorse the value of these forms
of autonomy and fairness, we are likely to accept that ethical theories
in fact are subject to the Guidance Constraint. (But, again, I do not
claim to have established this last point here.) If the argument I
have given is cogent, the only way to rule out my account of the
Guidance Constraint is to argue that the relevant forms of autonomy
41 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 130–1.
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and fairness are unimportant. Though coherent, this debunking option
is costly. For example, as we saw in §III, it conflicts with the important
role of autonomy in agency and that of fairness in the provision of
opportunities for leading a successful moral life. But the debunking
option shares some dialectical common ground with my account. The
holistic aspect of moral methodology should lead us to expect that
the Guidance Constraint is a defeasible norm for evaluating ethical
theories, just like norms such as simplicity and unity are.42 Thus a
defeasible Guidance Constraint agrees with the debunking option that
there can be some theoretical benefits that an ethical theory can gain by
violating the constraint and for whose sake it can reasonably sacrifice
some autonomy and fairness. On my account of the constraint, just
which trade-offs would be reasonable becomes an issue only to those
theories that value autonomy and fairness, since only those theories
see losses in autonomy and fairness as costs. Which trade-offs would be
reasonable is a complicated issue that is worth further reflection.43 But
it seems reasonable to allow that a fairly complex theory that rarely
undermines autonomy and fairness may well be better than a fairly
simple theory that often undermines them.44 Why should it then be
unreasonable to evaluate ethical theories partly in terms of whether
they provide adequate moral guidance, if the Guidance Constraint
turns out to be best grounded in some such morally substantive ideals
as autonomy and fairness?45
pekkav@ucdavis.edu
42 An anonymous referee asserted that internal consistency is an indefeasible norm. I
need not disagree, since nothing that I say implies that no norm for evaluating ethical
theories is indefeasible. But in fact the claim is controversial. Some writers argue that
it need not be irrational temporarily to tolerate a noticed inconsistency in a set of beliefs
when there are reasons to accept each belief, it is unclear which belief one should give
up, and one can isolate the effects of the inconsistency on the rest of one’s beliefs. See
Gilbert Harman, A Change in View (Cambridge, MA, 1986). This view agrees, of course,
that inconsistent beliefs cannot all be true together. But it denies that consistency is an
indefeasible norm of rational belief-revision. As a view about belief-revision, one would
expect it to have implications for moral methodology.
43 Another important issue concerns the relative weights of the different norms for
evaluating ethical theories discussed above. My argument does not require me to address
this issue. The claim that ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint, as well
as accounts of why that is so, are neutral on what weight the constraint has relative to
the other norms. On my account, its weight depends on how important autonomy and
fairness are relative to other ideals.
44 This is one explanation of why indirect forms of consequentialism typically are more
plausible than its direct forms.
45 I would like to thank Terence Irwin, Antti Kauppinen and several anonymous
referees for useful feedback on earlier versions of this article.
